Value conflict

Can AI Rely on the Systematicity of Truth? The Challenge of Modelling Normative Domains

Philosophy & Technology 38 (34): 1–27. 2025. doi:10.1007/s13347-025-00864-x

Argues that the asystematicity of normative domains, stemming from the plurality, incompatibility, and incommensurability of values, poses a challenge to AI’s ability to comprehensively model these domains and underscores the indispensable role of human agency in practical deliberation.

AI, large language models, systematicity, truth, value conflict, AI ethics, deliberation

Kein Sicherheitsnetz der Wahrheit: Warum Normativität für LLMs schwierig bleibt

meta(φ) 13 (1): 51—89. 2025.

AI, large language models, systematicity, truth, value conflict

Moralism as a Dualism in Ethics and Politics

Political Philosophy 1 (2): 432–462. 2024. doi:10.16995/pp.17532

Argues that both moralism in ethics and political moralism originate from a problematic dualism that transforms the useful distinction between the moral and the non-moral into a rigid divide. As the historical comparison with ancient Greek thought shows, this obscures genuine conflicts of values and fails to adequately address complex political realities such as “dirty hands” situations.

moralism, value conflict, political realism, ancient philosophy, Bernard Williams, Hume

The Dworkin–Williams Debate: Liberty, Conceptual Integrity, and Tragic Conflict in Politics

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1): 3–29. 2024. doi:10.1111/phpr.13002

By reconstructing the little-known Dworkin-Williams debate over whether political concepts like liberty and equality can and should be reconciled to avoid conflict, the article explores the nature of political values, the limits of philosophical intervention in politics, the challenge of pluralism, and the conditions for political legitimacy in the face of inevitable conflict and loss.

value conflict, political realism, legitimacy, liberty, Bernard Williams