Functions of concepts

Re-Engineering the Concept of Understanding for AI

With Pierre Beckmann.

Argues that the concept of understanding needs to be re-engineered for artificial cognition in a way that is empirically informed by mechanistic interpretability research and theoretically informed by a grasp of the functions of the concept.

AI, large language models, understanding, conceptual engineering, mechanistic interpretability, functions of concepts

Why We Care about Understanding: Competence through Predictive Compression

With Pierre Beckmann.

Offers a unifying account of understanding by reverse-engineering the function of both the state and the concept. Argues that we care about understanding because it grounds robust competence. Our concept of understanding evolved as an efficient proxy to track this elusive property, allowing us to identify who to trust and learn from. This highlights the sociality of understanding and how it shapes the character of human understanding. Understanding is the result of convergent pressures to predict the world using cognitive models that are not only accurate, but also compressed enough to be stored, demonstrated, and transmitted.

understanding, functions of concepts, conceptual reverse-engineering, testimony, AI, explainable AI

Debunking Concepts

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47 (1): 195–225. By invitation. 2023. doi:10.5840/msp2023111347

Argues that the debunking of concepts should extend beyond assessing their epistemological merits to include their evaluation on moral, social, and political grounds, based on their societal functions and effects.

genealogy, genealogical debunking, conceptual ethics, ideology critique, functions of concepts

Function-Based Conceptual Engineering and the Authority Problem

Mind 131 (524): 1247–1278. 2022. doi:10.1093/mind/fzac028

Identifies a central problem for conceptual engineering—the problem of establishing the authority of engineered concepts—and argues that this problem cannot generally be solved by appealing to increased precision, consistency, or other theoretical virtues. Solving the problem requires engineering to take a functional turn and attend to the functions of concepts. This also helps us alleviate Strawsonian worries about changes of topic.

conceptual engineering, functions of concepts, authority, theoretical virtues

The Essential Superficiality of the Voluntary and the Moralization of Psychology

Philosophical Studies 179 (5): 1591–1620. 2022. doi:10.1007/s11098-021-01720-2

Argues that the notion of the voluntary is an essentially superficial notion that does important work on the condition that we do not try to metaphysically deepen it, and that attempts to deepen it illustrate a problematic tendency to warp our conception of the mind under pressure from moral aspirations.

voluntariness, responsibility, moralism, free will, functions of concepts, Bernard Williams

Tracing Concepts to Needs

The Philosopher 109 (3): 34—39. 2021. https://philpapers.org/archive/QUETCT.pdf

genealogy, pragmatic genealogy, conceptual reverse-engineering, conceptual needs, functions of concepts, pragmatism

From Paradigm-Based Explanation to Pragmatic Genealogy

Mind 129 (515): 683–714. 2020. doi:10.1093/mind/fzy083

Why would philosophers interested in the points or functions of our conceptual practices bother with genealogical explanations if they can focus directly on paradigmatic examples of the practices we now have? This paper offers three reasons why the genealogical approach earns its keep and formulates criteria for determining when it is called for.

genealogy, pragmatic genealogy, paradigm-based explanation, functions of concepts, E. J. Craig, Miranda Fricker

On Ordered Pluralism

Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (3): 305–11. 2019. doi:10.1080/24740500.2020.1859234

Beginning with the debate concerning “moral justice forgiveness” and “gifted” forgiveness, this paper critically examines Miranda Fricker’s method for ordering plural conceptions of a practice. It argues that the selection of a paradigm case, such as “moral justice forgiveness,” is not absolute, but depends on which functional aspect of the practice one wishes to explain.

paradigm-based explanation, functions of concepts, conceptual ethics, Miranda Fricker

Revealing Social Functions through Pragmatic Genealogies

In Social Functions in Philosophy: Metaphysical, Normative, and Methodological Perspectives. Rebekka Hufendiek, Daniel James, and Raphael Van Riel (eds.), 200–218. London: Routledge. 2020. doi:10.4324/9780429435393

This paper argues that state-of-nature stories, read as dynamic models rather than history, can reveal how key normative practices meet collective needs of coordination, conflict-management, and non-domination. Drawing on Hume’s genealogy of justice, Williams’s genealogy of truthfulness, and related work, it shows how concepts like property, knowledge, and testimonial justice underpin social cooperation and political legitimacy. In doing so, it offers social and political philosophers a way to explain both the persistence of ideas and institutions and the grounds on which they can be criticized.

genealogy, pragmatic genealogy, functions of concepts, social cooperation, legitimacy, non-domination, Hume

The Points of Concepts: Their Types, Tensions, and Connections

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (8): 1122–1145. 2019. doi:10.1080/00455091.2019.1584940

By distinguishing four senses in which concepts might be said to have a “point,” this paper resolves the tension between the ambition of point-based explanations to be informative and the claim—central to Dummett’s philosophy of language, but also to the literature on thick concepts—that mastering concepts already requires grasping their point.

functions of concepts, conceptual ethics, conceptual engineering