Davidson
2 writings
Davidsonian Causalism and Wittgensteinian Anti-Causalism: A Rapprochement
Ergo 5 (6): 153–72. 2018. doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.006
Seeks a rapprochement in the longstanding debate between Davidsonian causalists and Wittgensteinian anti-causalists by arguing that both sides can agree that reasons are not causes, but that intentional explanations are causal explanations.
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Two Orders of Things: Wittgenstein on Reasons and Causes
Philosophy 92 (3): 369–97. 2017. doi:10.1017/S0031819117000055
Situating Wittgenstein in the causalism/anti-causalism debate in the philosophy of mind, this paper argues that Wittgenstein’s arguments differ from those of his immediate successors; that he anticipates current anti-psychologistic trends; and that he is perhaps closer to Davidson than historical dialectics suggest.
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