Listed in Theoretical Philosophy

Familiar Words, Unfamiliar Minds: Conventionalization without Calibration in the Vocabulary of Mind

Under review

Argues that the extension of the vocabulary of mind to language models pulls apart two processes that usually coincide: conventionalization, whereby a stretched word ceases to be marked as a stretch, and calibration, whereby the inferences it invites are fitted to what its new referents bear out. Much as a gene variant can go to fixation without being an adaptation, a word can become conventional without being calibrated. A corpus study of “hallucinate” in 8,568 abstracts and 31,866 forum comments shows conventionalization running most of its course within three years. Calibration need not keep pace: it presupposes a referent that is accessible, stable, and independent of the discourse about it, whereas language models are opaque, fast-changing, and trained on that very discourse. Where the invisible hand does not suffice, calibration has to be organized through a reciprocal division of linguistic labour, guided by a norm of targeted qualification: flag the specific inferences that an attribution invites but the evidence does not support.

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