Listed in Theoretical Philosophy

Disciplined Anthropomorphism: How to Extend Cognitive Language to Artificial Intelligence

Under review

Argues that those who describe AI in cognitive terms such as “understanding” and “believing” and the critics who denounce this as wishful anthropomorphism share a subsumptive approach: both ask whether AI systems fall under concepts minted for human beings, and report as discoveries about those systems verdicts that are largely determined by conceptual frames. Yet the problem AI poses is precisely how to frame these systems conceptually, and the rise of anthropomorphism is best seen as a response to that problem which needs disciplining rather than discouragement. A disciplined anthropomorphism disentangles the inferential connections bundled up in our cognitive concepts and asks which to preserve, sever, or forge for AI. The discipline comes from the human conceptual needs that give these connections their point, and from empirical and especially mechanistic evidence that supports and constrains them. The resulting conceptions of understanding and belief are not just thinned-out versions of existing ones, but potentially richer and better fitted to the peculiarities of AI.

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